

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 700124



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 24 January 1970*


**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**

*For the President Only*

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
## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1970



weekly average  
for each month

OCTOBER 1969 - JANUARY 1970



weekly data as reported





**US BATTLE DEATHS** declined from last week's 84 to 79 for this week. This makes the second week of decline in U.S. casualties.





**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** increased to a reported 246 from last week's 175. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN for these periods.





**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** stand at seven battalion-size and two smaller groups with a combined strength of 4,347. Additionally, four "gap fill" groups have been accepted, raising the total pipeline input since 23 October 1969 to some 31,700 to 32,700.



**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** rose from last week's 444 to 733 for this week. The increase is largely due to a brief surge of enemy activity in I Corps and III Corps.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** increased from last week's 1,797 to 1,942 for this week.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by RVN forces increased from 40% last week to 51% for this week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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*AVAILABLE*

**POOR ORIGINAL(S)**

**ODS**

Enemy Activity

The tempo of action picked up sharply, particularly in I and III Corps which experienced brief surges in the early part of the week, but the Communists generally continued to employ the same economy of force tactics that have long characterized their military activity. For the most part, enemy main force units are staying in Cambodian sanctuaries or remote base areas. The enemy has improved his tactical posture in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with movement of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 36th Regiment to the eastern part of the buffer zone. Preliminary COMINT indicators also point to the possible southward movement of elements of the NVA 304th Division.

Evidence continues to mount that the Communists plan to initiate a new round of heightened offensive activity, perhaps just prior to the Tet holiday (6 February), or in the wake of their self-proclaimed Tet truce period -- 5 to 9 February. The areas most likely to bear the brunt of any increased attacks will be I Corps, in the Danang and Hoi An area; II Corps, in northern Binh Dinh Province; and in western IV Corps, where three NVA regiments are poised near the province capital of Chau Doc. So long as these three regiments remain nearby, Chau Doc could be hit at any time.

Enemy Infiltration

The higher level of infiltration reflected in last week's report was maintained this week as some 4,300 infiltrators were detected moving south. While the increases of the past two weeks may be only part of a temporary surge, current activity patterns suggest that a sustained period of intensive inputs to the infiltration network has begun. Eight of this week's groups were detected in North Vietnam and one other group was detected in Laos. This brings the January total to 22 detected groups and nine "gap fill" groups, or approximately 14,000 infiltrators. This represents about 43 percent of the total accepted figure of approximately 32,000 troops which have entered the pipeline since 23 October 1969. 25X1B

South Vietnam Developments


President Thieu now says that his proposed reorganization of the corps area commands will not be implemented until next year. He also now says that the six new regional commands -- which would control the territorial forces engaged in pacification -- would be subordinate to the corps commanders, thus removing what seemed to be a serious weakness in the plan as reported earlier. Thieu feels that with the enemy likely to concentrate in the future on guerrilla tactics, this proposed reorganization will provide greater flexibility and permit the corps commanders to concentrate more on directing the regular army units. In addition to the removal of two division commanders and 14 province chiefs announced last week, Thieu says he is planning to promote a few colonels to general rank and to change a few more province chiefs. The reshuffle of generals in III and IV Corps appears to have been based primarily on military rather than political considerations, since the new appointees are considered aggressive and dynamic, as well as loyal to Thieu.

Ambassador Lam, Chief of the GVN's delegation to the Paris talks, has shown a cautious attitude toward the question of informal contacts between members of his staff and the Communists. [REDACTED] 25X1C  
 contacts are fraught with political risk because of the anti-communism in Saigon by the spy case involving President Thieu's office and Thieu's campaign against three alleged pro-Communist lower house deputies. During his recent visit to Saigon, Lam found that the key leaders in South Vietnam's executive and legislative branches seem uninterested or disdainful of the Paris talks on the grounds that

the GVN is "winning the war," thus making negotiations superfluous and even dangerous. Lam did not raise the question of contact with the other side with President Thieu, but his impression is that Thieu is not interested and possibly is opposed. Lam has not specifically prohibited his staff members from contacting the Communists, however.

Communist Developments

25X1B The festivities surrounding the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party (whose official birthday is 3 February 1930) are certain to produce articles, speeches, public appearances, and other tangible signs which should collectively shed some light on the current pecking order within the Hanoi leadership and on the leadership's current strategic thinking. We will be particularly interested in watching what role Party First Secretary Le Duan plays, or does not play. His conspicuous absence from the 21 December celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the People's Army of Vietnam (i.e., the NVA) was intriguing but hard to interpret. It will be very significant if he fails to play a prominent role in the forthcoming events keyed to this major Party anniversary.



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